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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENfr 
POINT ONE: 
The trial court excluded Ostler's evidence regarding 
the "moth phenomenon" on Rule 702 grounds that expert testimony 
in the matter would not be helpful to the jury. Wheeler attempts 
to raise additional theories to support the exclusion. This 
court should not consider these previously rejected theories but 
insteadf should focus on the Rule 702 issue alone. 
POINT TWO: 
The trial court ruled that expert testimony would add 
nothing to the jury's understanding of th$ "moth phenomenon." 
Wheeler's brief fails to explain how a layperson would not 
benefit from expert testimony in the matter. Closer examination 
reveals that the jury would have been assisted by Ostler's expert 
witnesses. 
POINT THREE: 
Both the trial court and Wheeler used the old common 
law standard regarding expert witnesses instead of the broader, 
more liberal standard promulgated in Rule 702. 
POINT FOUR: 
Wheeler introduced exhibits resting on the same 
factual basis as the "moth phenomenon" (i.e., that Ostler's eyes 
were, indeed, open at the time of the accident). Since the 
factual basis is the same as that supporting the occurrence of 
the "moth phenomenon." The trial court should have admitted 
Ostler's evidence as rebuttal testimony. 
POINT FIVE: 
Under Rule 104, the jury is the proper decider of 
issues of preliminary fact, not the trial judge. 
POINT SIX: 
Wheeler's violation of Federal drive-time regulations 
is relevant to a determination of proximate cause. Wheeler's 
illegal parking set up a chain of events culminating in the 
accident. Wheeler is a proximate cause. 
POINT SEVEN: 
The trial court improperly denied Ostler the 
opportunity to impeach Wheeler. Impeachment was intended to show 
Wheeler to be untruthful and was therefore, relevant. Wheeler's 
assertion that the standard of review in the matter of 
impeachment is abuse of discretion is incorrect under Rule 607.1. 
POINT EIGHT: 
Wheeler's brief fails to adequately respond to 
Huddleston v. U.Sf which states that when the probative value of 
the evidence outweighs the risk of prejudice, other bad acts may 
be used to support a conditional fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
2 
POINT NINE: 
Ostler asserts that Wheeler's failure to discuss his 
misstatement of law in closing argument is a concession in the 
matter. Such misstatement constitutes reversible error and 
should be corrected. 
POINT TEN: 
If it is prejudicial to raise the issue of insurance 
coverage during argument, it is likewise prejudicial to imply a 
lack of insurance, particularly when such is not the case. 
POINT ELEVEN; 
The jury instruction regarding Wheeler's duty to place 
warning devices erroneously introduced a "reasonable man" 
standard when the regulations, in fact, demand a much higher 
standard of care. 
POINT TWELVE: 
In instructing the jury on proximate causation, the 
court's instructions were erroneous and misleading. 
POINT THIRTEEN: 
The trial court should have ruled as a matter of law 
that Wheeler's illegal parking was a proximate cause of the 
accident. 
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POINT FOURTEEN: 
The trial court should have allowed an amendment of 
Ostler's claims to include a claim for punitive cases. Recent 
cases elucidate the issue of punitive damages and should be 
considered by the court. 
POINT FIFTEEN: 
Ostler's videotape re-creation of the accident should 
be allowed into evidence. This court should review the 
foundation for the videotape on a de novo basis. 
POINT SIXTEEN: 
Questions relating to insurance are improper during 
trial. Howeverf during voir dire questions relating to insurance 
are proper and should be allowed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT 
CONSIDER THEORIES THAT WERE NOT 
PROPERLY PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The trial court excluded all of the evidence regarding 
the "moth phenomenon." This evidence was excluded solely on the 
4 
basis of Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence.* Thus, the trial 
court stated: 
It seems to me that that's something that the 
jury can, just as well as anyone else, can 
infer and can determine from their own 
experience in this type of a circum-
stance, . . 
• * * 
. . .I'm still persuaded that this is 
something that the testimony of the expert is 
not going to be particularly helpful to the 
jury. 
(R. 2226 and R. 2274. ) 
Despite this very clear ruling, Wheeler's brief 
attempts to inject several new theories t<p justify the trial 
court's ruling. Wheeler's arguments on evidence are a bit 
unclear, but they seem to include the following: 
1. Dr. Hulbert was not qualified as an expert.2 
(Respondent's Brief at p. 5.) 
1,1
 If scientific, technical or other Specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue. . .an expert. \ .may testify there-
to. . 
^Actually, the trial court's ruling is to the contrary. 
Counsel, I don't have any question of the 
expertise of the doctor in several fields. 
R. 2226. 
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2. Dr. Hulbert has not formed an opinion based upon a 
reasonable scientific probability. (Respondent's 
Brief at p. 5.) 
3. Dr. Hulbert did not have sufficient data to form 
an opinion. (Respondent's Brief at p. 5 and 6.) 
4. The field of Human Factors Research is not a valid 
science. (Respondent's Brief at p. 6 and 21.) 
These grounds were either rejected by the trial court, 
or not even raised there.3 Therefore, this Court should skip 
over those issues and concentrate on the Rule 702 issue. 
The Rule 702 issue is more fully analyzed in Point II, 
below. 
POINT TWO 
WHEELER'S BRIEF TOTALLY FAILS 
TO ANALYZE THE RULE 702 ISSUE 
As noted in Point I, above, the trial court excluded 
evidence of the "moth phenomenon" on the basis of Rule 702.4 
-^Respondent's Brief does not cite to the record where those 
various theories were raised. Compare Substitute Brief of 
Appellant, p. 15 at para. J. 
^For text of Rule 702, see fn. 1 above. 
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Wheeler's Brief almost totally ignores the Rule 702 
issue. (Brief of Respondent, p. 21-23. Compare Substitute Brief 
of Appellant, p. 17-21.) Specifically, Wheeler's Brief fails to 
explain how a lay juror would have been able to "understand" the 
evidence without the assistance of testimony from Ostler's 
experts. Without this assistance, would a lay juror have any 
knowledge of the "moth phenomenon" or "highway hypnosis?" Or 
would a lay juror understand that the blinking lights of a parked 
truck tend to "lure" a sleepy driver into the lights? Finally, 
would a lay juror understand that the emergency lane is not 
intended for rest stops to urinate? (See generally, Substitute 
Brief of Appellant at p. 19-21.) 
Indeed, here we have expert testimony from Dr. Hulbert 
that these matters are beyond the experience of the lay juror. 
So, we are dealing here with a. . .fairly 
recent understanding of these matters in 
depth, [which would] not necessarily. . .be 
expected to be available to the lay person. 
Sure, they can understand it once its 
explained. 
(R. 2215.) 
Indeed, Ostler's brief pointed put that some accident 
investigators don't even understand the "moth phenomenon." 
(Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 19. Compare R. 2262-2264.) 
Again, Wheeler's Brief was silent. If some accident 
7 
investigators don't understand the "moth phenomenon," the matter 
is ipso facto beyond the ken of a lay juror. 
In summary, the trial court incorrectly ruled that 
expert testimony would not help the jury to understand the "moth 
phenomenon." However, Wheeler's brief has not explained how a 
layperson could understand those matters without expert 
assistance. A closer look shows that a lay jury would have been 
helped by Ostler's experts. 
POINT THREE 
RULE 702 HAS CHANGED THE 
OLD COMMON LAW RULE REGARDING EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Under the old common law, expert testimony was only 
admissible on matters outside the knowledge of a lay jury. The 
common law on that issue has squarely been changed by Rule 702: 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence. . .an 
expert. . .may testify thereto. . . 
Wheeler's brief relies upon the old common law. 
Specifically, Wheeler argues that expert testimony may only be 
received on matters outside the knowledge of a lay jury. (See 
Brief of Respondent at p. 21-2 3.) 
Wheeler relies principally on the case of Day v. 
Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965). 
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The simple response is that Day was decided under the old common 
law rule. Rule 702 was adopted as part of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence in 1983. 
There are still a few scattered cases, after Rule 702, 
which speak in terms of common knowledge. (See cases collected 
at p. 22-23, Brief of Respondent.) However, those cases 
represent an aberration which requires clarification: 
It is still sometimes stated that the subject 
matter must be beyond the common knowledge of 
the average layman, i.e., there must be 
unusual circumstances in the case. To the 
extent that such articulation is another way 
of stating that the experts' opinion is not 
helpful to understanding the evidence or to 
determining a fact in issue, i.e., is not 
helpful to comprehension or explanation, the 
statement is not objectionable. 
Graham, Handbook of Evidence, §702.4, fn. 5 (1988 pocket part). 
A clear explanation of the difference between the old 
common law rule and the new Rule 702 is contained in the case of 
In re: Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 72 3 
F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983): 
There are severe serious problems with the 
trial court's formulation of standards for 
determining admissibility under Rule 702. 
First, the requirement for admissibility that 
expert testimony be "beyond the jury's sphere 
of knowledge" adopts a formulation which was 
rejected by the drafters of Rule 702. While 
that formulation applied prior to the 
adoption of evidence rules, it no longer 
applies. 
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Such a test is incompatible with the 
standard of helpfulness expressed in 
Rule 702. First, it assumes wrongly 
that there is a bright line separating 
issues within the comprehension of 
jurors from those that are not. 
Secondly, even when jurors are well 
equipped to make judgments on the basis 
of their common knowledge and 
experience, experts may have specialized 
knowledge to bring to bear on the same 
issue which would be helpful. 
3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence 702[2]f at 709-9-10 (1982) 
(footnotes omitted). Moreover, the 
suggestion that the court must, in deciding 
on admissibility, carefully scrutinize the 
underlying assumptions, the inferences drawn, 
and the conclusions reached, if followed 
rigorously, would result in the trial court, 
as distinguished from the fact-finder, 
deciding the weight to be given to the 
testimony. 
Compare United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1984). 
In summary, the trial court excluded expert evidence on 
the basis that such matters were within the knowledge of a lay 
jury. However, that is now an outdated rule. 
POINT FOUR 
WHEELER'S BRIEF FAILS TO EXPLAIN 
WHY THE "MOTH PHENOMENON" EVIDENCE 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY 
As explained in Points One, Two and Three, testimony on 
the "moth phenomenon" was not received during Ostler's case-in-
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chief. The court reasoned that the "motli phenomenon" only works 
if the driver is awake to see the lights of the parked truck. 
The judge further ruled there was no showing that father Ostler 
was awake: 
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis for 
a determination on his part thdt there was a 
man that was either, that was not asleep or 
that the was merely somewhat impaired in his 
appreciation of things around t|im. 
(R. 2226.) 
However, the defense offered several photographs into 
evidence showing how a parked truck woulcf have appeared to father 
Ostler at various distances. (Exs. 53 through 68.) Ostler's 
brief explained that those photographs r^st on exactly the same 
factual basis as the "moth phenomenon." Specifically, the 
photographs of the parked truck are not iflaterial if father 
Ostler's eyes were not open to see the trjuck. (See Brief of 
Appellant, at p. 19.) But likewise, testimony on the "moth 
phenomenon" is not material if father OslJler's eyes were not 
open to "lure" him toward the lights. 
In short, the trial court shoulld have admitted both 
defendants' nighttime photos of the truck] and Ostler's rebuttal 
testimony on the "moth phenomenon"; or thje trial court should 
have rejected both pieces of testimony. IHowever, it was 
logically inconsistent to receive Wheeler's evidence (nighttime 
photos) while excluding Ostler's evidence of the "moth 
11 
-phenomenon." Both pieces of evidence were based on the 
foundation that father Ostler's eyes were open to see the parked 
truck. 
Againf Qatlor'c brief was entirely silent on this 
critical issue! 
POINT FIVE 
THE JURY—NOT THE JUDGE—SHOULD 
DECIDE PRELIMINARY FACT ISSUES UNDER RULE 104 
An important part of Ostler's case is the so-called 
"moth phenomenon." Ostler's theory is that father Ostler was 
tired or in a reduced state of alertness. In that state, father 
Ostler thought he was following the lights of a moving truck. 
Instead, father Ostler was "lured" into the rear of an illegally 
parked truck. (See generally, Substitute Brief of Appellant, at 
p. 2 and 3.) A threshold issue to this "moth phenomenon" theory 
is whether father Ostler had his eyes open or whether he was 
asleep. 
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Ostler's brief listed five pieces of evidence from 
which a jury could conclude that father Ostler was awake.^ (See 
Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 4 and 5.) Wheeler's brief 
responded by interpreting those facts in a different light. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 10-11.) 
However, Wheeler's brief misses the whole point. The 
issue is not how to interpret the facts. Rather, the issue is who 
should interpret the facts—the judge or the jury. In this case, 
the trial court judge (rather than the jury) interpreted the 
facts: 
. . .I'm not persuaded that in this case the 
testimony is going to be helpful to the jury. 
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis for 
a determination on his part that there was a 
man that was either, that was not asleep, or 
that he was merely somewhat impaired in his 
appreciation of the things arour)d him. 
• * * 
The facts are that the man ran off and hit 
into the back of a truck. There is nothing 
that's been shown or indicated that that is 
consistent with being asleep, any less 
than. . .consistent with being inattentive. 
(R. 2226 and 2227. ) 
5Specifically, the truck driver testified that father Ostler 
appeared to be awake and changing lanes; shallow angle of impact; 
father Ostler was not tired; curve in the roadway; and speed of 
impact. 
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Ostler's opening brief argued that this issue is 
controlled by Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence6. Ostler's brief 
cited the Federal Advisory Comment and the recent case of 
Huddleston v. U.S., U.S. 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed.2d 
771 (1988). 
Wheeler's brief was absolutely silent on this crucial 
issue. Indeed, Wheeler's brief does not even mention Rule 104. 
Nor does Wheeler's brief explain why the preliminary fact issue 
(whether father Ostler was awake or asleep) was decided by the 
judge instead of the jury. 
Instead, Wheeler resorts to factual arguments. 
Specifically, Wheeler gives several fact theories to reach the 
conclusion that father Ostler was asleep (Brief of Respondent, at 
p. 10-11). However, those are really jury arguments. The place 
to make those arguments is before the jury—not an appellate 
court. 
In the words of Huddleston v. United States, (supra): 
In determining whether the government has 
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 
104(b), the trial court neither weighs 
credibility nor makes a finding that the 
government has proved the conditional fact by 
a preponderance of the evidence. The court 
b
"Preliminary Questions. When the relevancy of evidence 
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court 
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence 
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition." 
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simply examines all the evidence in the case 
and decides whether the jury could reasonably 
find the conditional fact. . .by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Huddleston v. United States, U-S. ; 108 S.Ct. 
1496, 1501; 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). 
Actually, the shoe is on the other foot. There is no 
evidence in this record that father Ostler was asleep. However, 
without hearing evidence on the "moth phenomenon" as an 
alternative, the jury could only speculate that father Ostler was 
asleep. (On closing argument, Wheeler suggested that father 
Ostler was asleep. R. 1925.) 
The solution was simple. The jury should have been 
permitted to hear evidence on the "moth phenomenon." Thereafter, 
they could have weighed the facts and decided if father Ostler 
was asleep or awake. If he was awake, the jury could have 
further considered the effect of the "moth phenomenon" as it 
bears on this accident. 
POINT SIX 
A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL DRIVE-TIME 
REGULATIONS IS RELEVANT TO PROXIMATE CAUSE 
At trial, Ostler proferred evidence that Wheeler had 
violated several federal regulations with respect to how long a 
truck driver may be on duty. (Drive-time regulations.) The 
15 
trial court excluded all of that evidence. Ostler's opening 
brief argued that it was reversible error to exclude evidence of 
those drive-time regulations. (Substitute Brief of Appellant, at 
p. 8-10 and p. 23.) Wheeler's Brief responds that evidence of 
the drive-time regulations was properly excluded. Specificallyf 
Wheeler argues that the only issue in the case was proximate 
cause. Wheeler says that a violation of the drive-time 
regulations is not relevant to proximate cause. (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 12-15.) 
A. Ostler's Fact Theory on Proximate Cause. 
Ostler's fact theory on causation is as follows: 
The Federal government sets regulations for how long a 
trucker may drive. 49 C.F.R. 5395.3(a)(1); 49 C.F.R. 
§395.3(a)(2); 49 C.F.R. §395.3(b); and 49 C.F.R. §391.2. 
(Regulations quoted at p. 8 and 9, Substitute Brief of 
Appellant.) The purpose of those federal regulations is to keep 
exhausted, and therefore dangerous drivers off the road. (R. 
2132.) 
The symptoms of driving with fatigue are basically the 
same as driving drunk. (R. 2261.) Wheeler was more than 200% 
over his Federal drive-time limitation. (R. 2133.) Because of 
his exhausted condition, Wheeler had to drink coffee to stay 
awake. The coffee acted as a diuretic causing Wheeler to stop 
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and urinate. (R. 2098.) Or, perhaps to stop and sleep. 
Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 26, n.ll and p. 29.) 
The purpose of the emergency lane is only for true 
emergencies—not to stop and urinate. (R. 2204-2205.) Roby By 
and Through Roby v. Kingsley, 492 So.2d 789 (Fla.App. 1986). 
The emergency lane is designed in such a way that 
drivers who are temporarily inattentive or sleepy have an 
excellent chance to recover without injury. (R. 2204-2205; 
R. 1368.) Truckers in general and Wheeler specifically are 
trained that it is dangerous to park in the emergency lane. 
(R. 2267, Ex. 82.) 
If Wheeler's truck had not been illegally parked, the 
Ostler car would have travelled harmlessly into the desert. (R. 
1028-1031.) 
The lights of parked vehicles tend to "lure" tired 
drivers toward the lights just as a moth to a flame. (R. 2208-
2211. ) 
Father Ostler was not asleep at the wheel, rather he 
was tired, and he was tricked by the "moth phenomenon." (Brief 
of Appellant, at p. 3-5.) 
It is true that the jury may, or may not, have believed 
all of that evidence. However, there is certainly evidence in 
the record to support a jury finding on each issue. The jury 
should have been given the opportunity to do so. 
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B. Legal Test for Proximate Cause. 
Utah has adopted the "substantial factor" test to 
determine proximate cause.' Devine v. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073, 
3 Utah 2d 134; Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P.2d 1013, 1 Utah 
2d 308; Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 
1985) . 
A "substantial factor" need not be the sole factor or 
the primary factor. McKenna v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-
schaft, et al., 558 P.2d 1018. Indeed, there may be several 
"substantial factors" contributing to the same accident. Morgan 
v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 660 (Wise. 1979); 
see also, W. Prosser, Law of Torts, Chapter 7, p. 268: 
If the defendant's conduct was a substantial 
factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it 
follows that he will not be absolved from 
liability merely because other causes have 
contributed to the result, since such causes, 
innumerable, are always present. In 
particular, however, a defendant is not 
necessarily relieved of liability because the 
negligence of another person [father Ostler] 
is also a contributing cause and that person, 
too, is to be held liable. 
Also, it makes no difference how large or how small a 
cause is to make it a "substantial cause." McDowell v. Davis, 
448 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1968). Proximate cause, like any other issue 
^The "substantial factor" test is based upon Restatement of 
Torts, 2d, §431. 
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of fact, may be established by circumstantial evidence. Johnson 
v. Acord, 608 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.App. 1980)• Finally, an act may be 
a proximate cause even though the actor c^ oes not foresee the 
injury in the precise form in which it occurred. Glenn v. 
Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P.2d 1013, 1 Utah 2d 308 (1954). 
Many courts use a "but for" analysis, as a shorthand 
way of determining the "substantial factor." 
From such cases many courts ha^e derived a 
rule, commonly known as the "bijt for" or 
"sine qua non" rule, which mayjbe stated as 
follows: The defendant's conduct is a cause 
of the event if the event woulq not have 
occurred but for that conduct; conversely, 
the defendants' conduct is not a cause of the 
event, if the event would have occurred 
without it. 
• * * * 
Restricted to the question of Causation 
alone, and regarded merely as al rule of 
exclusion, the "but for" rule sjerves to 
explain the greater number of c|ases. . . 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, §41 (5th Ed. 1984). 
Although no Utah cases have bee|n found which adopt the 
"but for" test; the "but for" test is conlsistent with the 
standard Utah instruction on proximate caiuse: 
The proximate cause of an injury is that 
cause which, in natural and con tinuous 
sequence produces an injury, and without 
which the result would not have! occurred. 
J.I.F.U. 15.6. Compare R. 1611 and 1617. See also, Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enterprises, supra. 
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In short, the proximate cause issue may be resolved by 
applying the "but for" test to the facts as follows: 
1. "But for" Wheeler's violation of the 10-hour, 15-
hour and 70-hour rules, he would not have been 
exhausted. 
2. "But for" Wheeler's exhaustionf he would have not 
made a dangerous non-emergency stop in the 
emergency lane. 
3. "But for" Wheeler's exhaustion, he would have 
observed numerous exits where he could have safely 
stopped to urinate or sleep. 
4. "But for" Wheeler's tail lights in the emergency 
lanef Father Ostler would not have been tricked by 
the "moth phenomenon." 
5. "But for" the illegally parked truck, which 
blocked the "safe recovery zone," father Ostler 
would have run harmlessly into the desert. 
The case of Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 
217 (Utah 1983) is helpful. Harris is the landmark Utah case on 
the issue of superseding or concurrent causation. Of course, 
that is the exact issue involved in the instant case. In Harris, 
a bus had stopped to pick up passengers. A following driver did 
not see the parked bus in time. The following car hit the bus. 
20 
One of the passengers in the car was injured. The plaintiff 
(i.e., the injured passenger from the car) claimed, inter alia, 
that the bus had faulty tail lights. Plaintiff offered evidence 
of subsequent repair records to show that the tail lights were 
faulty. The trial court excluded the repair records. Our 
Supreme Court held that: 
Although the alleged malfunctioning of the 
brake lights of the bus may havG been caused 
by the accident itself, the plaintiff's 
theory was that the lights were defective 
prior to the accident and that the defect was 
a causative factor. Under the circumstances, 
whether the lights were malfunctioning and 
whether they contributed to the accident were 
questions of fact for the jury. In short, it 
was error to exclude the evidence. 
671 P.2d at 222. (Emphasis added.) 
The teaching of Harris is that evidence of proximate 
cause should be admitted where there is ai theoretical link 
between the negligent act and the injury. Ultimately, the jury 
will decide if causation exists, but the jury is entitled to 
hear all evidence which might assist thent in reaching that 
conclusion. Likewise, it was absurd, in Ithis case, for the jury 
to be instructed that Wheeler was negligent for parking in the 
emergency lane, while excluding evidence that violation of the 
10-hour rule, the 15-hour rule and the 7(i-hour rule started a 
chain of events which ultimately led Wheeler to be involved in 
the accident. 
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C. Purpose of the Drive-Time Regulations. 
Wheeler's main argument is that the drive-time 
regulations are intended to protect the public from truckers who 
are actually driving. Since Wheeler was not actually driving 
(but illegally parked), Wheeler argues that the drive-time 
regulations are not relevant. (Brief of Respondent, p. 12-14.) 
The problem is that Wheeler does not cite any 
testimony, case law, or legislative history to support his theory 
on the purpose of the regulation. On the contrary, the expert 
testimony in this record is that the purpose of the drive-time 
regulations is to keep exhausted drivers off the road. 
(R. 2132.) Case law also supports that viewpoint. See United 
States v. Sawyer Transport, 337 F. Supp. 29 (Minn. 1971). 
Compare Laird v. Travellers Ins. Co., 267 So.2d 714 (La. 1972). 
Furthermore, Wheeler cites no authority for the 
proposition that the purpose of a statute is relevant to 
proximate cause. In this case, negligence had already been 
decided as a matter of law. What remained was only the issue of 
proximate cause. 
Proximate cause may exist even though Wheeler did not 
foresee this type of accident. Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed, 265 P.2d 
1013; 1 Utah 2d 308 (1954). Since Wheeler was not required to 
foresee this type of accident, the purpose of the statute would 
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be irrelevant to proximate cause.^ Rather, the search for 
proximate cause is simply a matter of tracing the chain of events 
from the time of the injury backward to t[he point of the alleged 
negligence. Jordan v. General Growth Development Corp., 67 5 
S.W.2d 901 (Mo. App. 1984). Furthermore, evidence which may be 
irrelevant on issue of negligence, may nevertheless, be relevant 
and admissible on the issue of proximate pause. Kellar v. 
General Motors, 21 Fed. Rules Evid. Serv. 461 (4th Cir. 1986— 
unpublished). 
D. Pearce v. Wistisen or Rule 403. 
Wheeler argues that evidence on violation of the drive-
time regulations was excluded pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules 
of Evidence.^ 
However, it is by no means cleatr the trial court judge 
had Rule 403 in mind when he excluded the evidence. Certainly, 
Wheeler has not cited any portion of the Record in which the 
judge made a Rule 403 determination. 
8In fact, the only evidence is that the type of accident 
was, in fact, foreseeable. See Substitute Brief of Appellant, at 
p. 10, 11, 64, 65. 
9
"Although relevant, evidence may bel excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. . ." 
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It is generally said that the more essential the 
evidence to a party's case, the greater the probative value 
under Rule 403. United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1239-40 
(9th Cir. 1981).10 
Even if there is a Rule 403 problem in this case, this 
court ought to consider the teachings of Hill v. Bache Halsey 
Stuart Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 825-826; 
We recognize that a trial court has broad 
discretion to determine whether evidence is 
relevant, and its decision will not be 
reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of 
that discretion. [Citation omitted.] The 
same standard of review applies to a trial 
court's determination, under Rule 403 that 
the probative value of evidence is outweighed 
by its potential to prejudice or confuse the 
jury or lead to undue delay. Nevertheless, a 
district court's decision need not be 
outlandish or malicious to rise to the status 
of clear abuse. Rather, the reviewing court 
need only be firmly convinced that a mistake 
has been made. 
l^This case is easily distinguished from Pearce v. Wistisen, 
701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985). In Pearce, evidence of alcohol was 
excluded because the accident happened nearly two days after the 
use of alcohol and after the alcohol was completely out of his 
system. In this case, Wheeler pulled his truck off the road 
specifically because he was fatigued in violation of Federal 
regulations. The accident occurred while he was still in that 
fatigued condition and as a direct result of violation of the 
Federal regulations. 
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POINT SEVEN 
WHEELER HAS OFFERED NO GCbOD FAITH 
ARGUMENT ON THE IMPEACHMENT ISSUES 
Wheeler's story is that he stopped for three minutes in 
the emergency lane to urinate. Ostler sought to impeach that 
testimony. The purpose of the impeachment was to show that 
Wheeler had been stopped for more than t0n minutes. (Perhaps, to 
sleep.) If Wheeler was stopped over ten minutes, he had a 
Federal duty to put out warning devices. (See generally, 
Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 24-26, 40-43.) Wheeler's 
response was simply that the impeachment was not relevant. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 27-30.) 
This inquiry breaks down into ^hree sub-issues. 
Wheeler has made no good faith response to any of these sub-
issues. 
Sub-Issue No. 1: Is the Impeaching Question Relevant? 
The impeaching question was as follows: "How long had 
you been looking for a place to stop and urinate before you 
actually stopped?" Wheeler says that question was not relevant. 
Specifically, Wheeler argues that the court had already directed 
a verdict on negligence. Therefore, why or how long Wheeler 
stopped was not relevant. (Brief of Respondent, p. 29-30.) 
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However, Wheeler wholly misunderstands the law of 
impeachment. Impeachment evidence is always relevant if it tends 
to show that a party is untruthful: 
Since circumstantial evidence bearing on the 
credibility of a witness tends to make the 
existence of a fact of consequence in the 
determination of the action more or less 
probable than without such evidence, 
circumstantial evidence bearing on the 
credibility of a witness is relevant. 
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, §607.2 (2d Ed. 1986). In 
other words, it is not necessary that the impeaching question be 
relevant to Ostler's cause of action. It is only necessary that 
the impeaching question be relevant to whether or not Wheeler was 
truthful. If Wheeler was not truthful about looking for 30 min-
utes for a place to stop and urinate, the jury may conclude that 
he was not truthful when he said he had only stopped for three 
minutes. (Perhaps, he stopped 30 minutes to sleep.) 
Sub-Issue No. 2: Should Ostler Have Been Permitted to Offer 
Extrinsic Evidence to Contradict Wheeler's 
Response to the Impeaching Question? 
The impeaching question was: "How long had you been 
looking for a place to stop and urinate before you actually 
stopped?" In the actual trial, Wheeler was not permitted to 
answer. However, Ostler's offer of proof was that Wheeler would 
answer that he was looking for approximately 30 minutes for a 
place to stop. (R. 2095.) 
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The next issue is whether Ostle|r should have been 
permitted to offer extrinsic evidence to contradict that 
statement . -1-1 A textual explanation will be helpful. 
On cross-examination, every permissible type 
of impeachment may be employed for cross-
examination [which] has as one iof its 
purposes the testing of the credibility of 
the witness. The use of extrinsic evidence 
to contradict is more restricted due to 
considerations of confusion of the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue consumption of 
time, and unfair prejudice raided by the 
introduction of so-called collateral matters. 
If a matter is considered collateral, the 
testimony of the witness on direct or cross-
examination stands—the cross-examiner must 
take the witness' answer; extrinsic evidence, 
i.e., evidence offered other than through the 
witness himself, in contradiction is not 
permitted. If the matter is nc}>t collateral, 
extrinsic evidence may be introduced 
disputing the witness' testimony on direct 
examination or denial of truth of the facts 
asserted in a question propounded on cross-
examination. 
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, §607.2 (2d Ed. 1986). 
11Ostlerfs extrinsic evidence was an aerial photograph. 
(See Substitute Brief of Appellant, p, 25.) The photo showed 
eight exits where Wheeler could have pulled off to urinate. The 
inference was that Wheeler lied when he Said he was looking for 
30 minutes; otherwise, he could have used any of the eight turn-
offs. Although the conclusion is circumstantial, circumstantial 
evidence is permitted for purposes of imjpeachment. McCormick on 
Evidence, §185, para. 435-36 (Cleary Ed.| 1972); Graham, Handbook 
of Federal Evidence, §401.1 (2d Ed. 1986|) . 
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Ostler's opening brief cited four cases from McCormick 
on Evidence, to support the proposition that the aerial map was 
not collateral (Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 27-29). 
Wheeler has made no response whatsoever to the argument on 
collateral versus non-collateral evidence. 
Furthermore, the evidence was collateral under a second 
theory. After the wreck, Wheeler had a built-in bias to hide the 
fact that he had violated a Federal regulation.H Thus, he had a 
motive to fabricate the story about stopping to urinate. Where 
cross-examination deals with bias, prejudice, or interest, the 
impeaching material is never collateral. United States v. 
Robinson, 530 F.2d 1076, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Harvey, 547 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1976). See also, Graham, 
Handbook on Evidence, §607.7 (2d Ed. 1986). 
Sub-Issue No. 3: Standard of Review. 
Wheeler's brief argues that the sole standard of review 
for impeachment matters is abuse of discretion. (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 30.) However, Ostler's brief points out some 
important exceptions to that rule. Specifically, the trial 
court has substantial discretion to regulate the scope of cross-
examination. However, the trial court does not have power to 
l^ if wheeler had stopped to sleep for over ten minutes, he 
would have had a Federal duty to set out warning devices. See 49 
C.F.R. §393.95; 49 C.F.R. §392.22(b). 
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totally exclude cross-examination on a given subject. 
(Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 29.) Wheeler's brief was 
silent on this issue. 
Sub-Issue No. 4; Abuse of Discretion. 
The trial court did not clearly understand the law of 
impeachment. Since the court based its ruling on a misunder-
standing of the law, discretion was abused- (Substitute Brief of 
Appellant, at p. 29-30). 
Ostler's opening brief cited thfe following colloquy to 
show that the judge was confused on the law of impeachment. 
Wheeler's brief was wholly silent on thesie important issues. 
THE COURT: Well, supposing he isays "I was 
looking for 30 minutes?" 
MR. DEBRY: Then I impeach him. 
THE COURT: Why? Because he's already, 
that's consistent with his prior statement. 
MR. DEBRY: There are many way^ to impeach, 
your Honor. One mode of impeadhment is a 
prior inconsistent statement. We are not 
trying to impeach him with a pijior 
inconsistent statement. We are trying to 
demonstrate to the Jury that he lied under 
oath. 
THE COURT: Well, I disagree wi^ th you, Mr. 
Debry. I'm going to sustain the objection. 
If that's the basis on which you are 
attempting to get at it. It appears to the 
Court that it has no, that that is not any 
basis for impeachment. 
(R. 2632.) 
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After re-reading the transcriptr Ostler has found 
additional support that the trial court did not understand the 
law of impeachment: 
Q: (By Mr. DeBry) Wellf the question, Mr. 
Wheeler, now out of the presence of the Jury, 
is: How long had you been looking for a 
place to stop before you actually pulled 
over? 
A: Approximately 30 minutes. 
MR. DEBRY: Now, at that point, your Honor, 
and that's what I anticipated he would say, 
because that's exactly what he said in his 
deposition. 
• • * • 
Now. . .the purpose of the question is merely 
to provide impeaching material. I'm not 
putting this big chart in evidence yet, I'll 
do it later. But I would later show by this 
chart and others that he's talking out of 
both sides of his mouth. He said "I was 
looking for 30 minutes for a place to park." 
We'll show he went by, you know, whatever, 
two, three, four exits. And that's 
inconsistent. I've pointed out an 
inconsistency in his testimony. 
THE COURT: Well, if that is his testimony 
I'm going to sustain the objection, because 
it doesn't show any discrepancy between that 
and his testimony at deposition. There may 
be a lot of reasons why he didn't accept 
those turnoffs, Mr. DeBry. If he's not 
familiar with the road, he may not have any 
idea what you are getting into by pulling off 
on those exits. 
So the objection will be sustained. 
(R. 2095-2096.) 
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Obviously, the trial court judge acted as factfinder. 
Obviously, the trial court judge supposed there was but one mode 
of impeachment (prior inconsistent statement). Ostler's brief 
pointed out that there are several modes |of impeachment.13 The 
trial court erred, as a matter of law, because it based its 
ruling on a mistaken view of the law. (See Substitute Brief of 
Appellant at p. 29-30.) 
Wheeler's brief failed to respond to the argument that 
the trial judge was confused about the le(w of impeachment. 
POINT EIGHT 
WHEELER'S BRIEF FAIL$ TO 
ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO THE LANDMARK CASE OF 
HUDDLESTON V, U.S. REGARDING IfRIOR BAD ACTS 
Ostler's brief argues that Wheeler was guilty of 
certain bad acts. Specifically, Wheeler was 25.25 hours over the 
10-hour Federal limit; 26.7 5 hours over the 15-hour Federal 
limit; and 86.2 5 hours over the 7 0-hour federal limit. 
(Substitute Brief of Appellant, p. 9.) It would, of course, be 
improper to offer this evidence to show that Wheeler was a bad 
^Ostler's opening brief incorrectly cited West's Handbook 
on Evidence. (Substitute Brief of Appellant at p. 30.) The 
correct citation should be, Graham, Handbook on Evidence §607.1, 
For the convenience of the court, the section describing the 
various modes of impeachment is found at &x±rj±rit A« 
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man. See Rule 404(b) and 608(b) Utah Rules of Evidence. 
However, the evidence could be offered to show motive. 
Specifically, that Wheeler had a motive to lie. See Substitute 
Brief of Appellant, at p. 32. 
Wheeler's brief fails to adequately discuss Huddleston 
v. United States, U.S. ; 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed.2d 771 
(1988). Huddleston is a landmark case. To the extent that 
earlier Utah cases might disagree, this court should now 
reconsider those cases in light of Huddleston. 
POINT NINE 
WHEELER'S BRIEF APPARENTLY 
CONCEDES THAT COUNSEL MISSTATED 
THE LAW IN CLOSING ARGUMENT AND THAT 
SUCH MISSTATEMENT CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Ostler's opening brief argued that misstatements of law 
were made in closing argument. (Substitute Brief of Appellant, 
at p. 32-36•) 
Wheeler makes some limited response. (Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 36-37.) However, nowhere does Wheeler claim 
that his statements of law during closing argument were correct. 
Obviously, Wheeler admits (as he must) that he did make 
misstatements of law in closing argument. 
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Ostler's brief also pointed out that the trial court 
judge has no discretion in this area. It is reversible error for 
counsel to misstate the law in closing argument. (Substitute 
Brief of Appellant, at p. 33-34.) Apparently, Wheeler also 
concedes this crucial point. 
Wheeler's sole defense is that the judge somehow cured 
the error. The judge said: 
The jury is directed to look atj the 
Instructions. They set forth tf\e law in that 
regard. Statement of counsel i^ to be 
disregarded except as it is accurate. 
(R. 1927.) 
The problem is that the judge didn't rule at all. He 
merely asked the jury to do his job for h^ Lm. 
Supposedly, the jury was to return to the jury room; 
re-read the instructions; then compare th0se written instructions 
with their memory of oral argument; and rteject any part of the 
oral argument which didn't match the written instructions. That 
is, of course, an impossible task. In a jsomewhat similar con-
text, our Supreme Court has stated: 
That position suggests an unwarranted naivety 
regarding human nature. 
State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 11984). 
In some future closing argument, a lawyer might mis-
takenly or intentionally misstate the law. Presumably, opposing 
counsel will rise to object. If this case passes muster, the 
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judge will no longer rule; rather, the judge will respond by 
telling the jury to just read the instructions, A very unfortu-
nate precedent will have thus been born, 
Wheeler cites four old Missouri cases for the 
proposition that the error could be cured by simply telling the 
jury to follow the written instructions. (Brief of Respondent, 
p. 36.) However, all of those older cases were in effect 
overruled by Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1977). (See 
Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 35.) 
Finally, Wheeler's brief discusses State v. Shickles, 
760 P.2d 291, 85 UAR 3 (1988). However, this case is more 
egregious than Shickles. In Shickles, the attorney corrected his 
misstatement of law during argument. In this case, Wheeler's 
counsel never corrected the misstatement of law. In short, in 
this case there was no ruling by the judge, and there was no 
correction by counsel. Thus, the jury was easily misled. 
POINT TEN 
IF IT IS PREJUDICIAL TO 
ARGUE INSURANCE COVERAGE AT TRIAL, 
IT IS LIKEWISE PREJUDICIAL TO ARGUE 
LACK OF INSURANCE COVERAGE 
In closing argument, Wheeler's attorney suggested that 
the defendants would have to pay any judgment from their own 
pockets. Ostler's brief argued that such comments were improper. 
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(Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 37 and 38.) Wheeler's 
brief makes a curious response. Wheeler claims that Ostler 
improperly injected insurance into the tirial during the following 
colloquy: 
Q. What is that yellow piece of paper you 
read? 
A. I believe that was the statement I gave 
the insurance man the day following. 
(See Brief of Respondent, at p. 38.) 
For purposes of argument, Ostler concedes that the 
subject of insurance was improperly before the jury.-*-4 However, 
the remedy for that situation should hav$ been a mistrial or a 
curative instruction. 
Apparently, Wheeler seeks to cure the insurance problem 
with a falsehood. In other words, it was true (even though 
inadmissible) that Wheeler was insured. Unfortunately, that 
testimony was before the jury. However, it was a falsehood for 
Wheeler's counsel to cure that error by arguing that Wheeler had 
14Wheeler claims that this testimony was improperly 
"elicited" by Ostler's counsel. (Brief cf>f Respondent, at p. 38.) 
Actually, that testimony came in as a total surprise. 
(R. 2074.) 
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to pay any judgment out of his own pocket. i^ > In fact, the 
opposite is true. The insurance carrier will pay/cover all or 
most of any judgment. 
The Wheeler's argument that the defendants would 
personally pay for any judgment, is another way of implying to 
the jury that there is no insurance coverage. There are sound 
policy reasons to exclude the existence of insurance coverage 
from the jury. However, any argument of non-insurance should be 
-"--'Ostler's opening brief cited the following statement from 
Wheeler's closing argument: 
This case is not to decide how much(sic) 
injuries Ralph has. . .This case is to decide 
whether Wheeler, F & R Roe and Albina are to 
pay for the injuries to Ralph. . . 
(R. 1930). 
After re-reading the transcripts the following additional 
irregularity is noted: 
If you find that one percent of the cause of 
this accident was his parking or the failure 
to put out triangles, one percent, they 
collect it all from defendants. 
• • * * 
He [the judge] has instructed you to 
determine if Stanley Wheeler was the cause of 
this accident, and if you do, if you conclude 
that, then the defendants pay. 
(R. 1931.) 
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excluded for the same policy reasons. Hill v. Cloward, 377 P.2d 
186 (Utah 1962). 
Counsel's closing argument that Wheeler had to "pay for 
the injuries" was especially egregious when seen in context. 
Over Ostler's objections, Wheeler had already told the jury that 
the truck was owned by one Ruby Roe, a bookkeeper; that the whole 
company consisted of only two trucks; and that Ruby's husband had 
recently died of cancer. (R. 2779 and 2780.) Likewise, the jury 
was told that Wheeler would have to pay 100% of the damages, even 
if he was only 1 percent negligent. (R. 1511. Compare R. 19 31.) 
In summary, the jury was left with the impression that 
there was no insurance coverage; that any judgment would come 
from Wheeler's own pocket; that this was a small family business 
in difficult circumstances; and that Wheeler would have to pay 
for all of the damages even though he was only 1 percent 
negligent. Such arguments were greatly misleading and 
prejudicial. 
POINT ELEVEN 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON 
FLARES AND TRIANGLES ERRONEOUSLY 
INTRODUCE A "REASONABLE MAN" STANDARD 
Federal regulations require truckers to place warning 
flares or triangles "as soon as possible, but in any event within 
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10 minutes." 49 C.F.R. §392.22(b). The trial court's instruc-
tion seemed to place a lesser duty on Wheeler. (See Substitute 
Brief of Appellant, at p. 40-42.) Wheeler responded by inter-
preting the regulation. Wheeler says: 
The regulation that flares should be placed 
"as soon as possible, but in any event within 
ten minutes" inherently implies that it may 
not be possible to place flares if to do so 
would take longer than the time a vehicle is 
stopped. . .The regulation does not 
contemplate that warning devices must be 
placed on all short stops. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 42-43.) 
The trouble is that Wheeler cites no cases or 
legislative history for his interpretation. Indeed, the 
testimony is to the contrary. Stopping a truck momentarily (even 
to urinate) in the emergency lane can be deadly; and truck 
drivers are so trained. (Exhibit A to Brief of Appellant. See 
also, Substitute Brief of Appellant, at p. 64-66.) Finally, the 
regulations themselves state: 
The objective of the Motor Carrier Safety 
Assistance Program (MCSAP) is to reduce the 
number and severity of accidents. . . 
involving commercial motor vehicles by 
substantially increasing the level of 
enforcement activity and the likelihood that 
safety defects, driver deficiencies and 
unsafe carrier practices will be detected and 
corrected. 
49 C.F.R. §350.7. 
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In short, it is deadly business for trucks to park even 
momentarily in the emergency lane. The regulation means exactly 
what it says. Truckers ought to wait for the next rest stop to 
urinate. If they can't wait, they have a Federal duty to put out 
flares or triangles "as soon as possible." 
Any other interpretation would encourage drivers to 
casually make brief stops. The Federal regulatory scheme 
specifically anticipates that all such brief stops should be made 
in designated highway rest areas. (R. 1343.) 
In short, the court gave a "reasonable man" 
instruction. However, the Federal regulation requires a 
substantially higher standard. 
POINT TWELVE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON 
PROXIMATE CAUSATION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
The most important instruction given by the trial court 
was No. 25 on intervening independent causation. That 
instruction defined intervening independent causation solely in 
terms of foreseeability. Ostler pointed out that foreseeability 
is not the sole requirement for proximate causation. See 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §435(l).16 The Restatement of Torts 
16For complete text, see Appendix */ 
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S4421' lists six factors that are important-in determining 
whether an independent cause has intervened. None of these 
factors were included in the court's instruction to the jury. 
(Foreseeability is not one of the six factors.) 
Wheeler selectively lifts statements from prior Utah 
decisions that discuss only foreseeability- The implication is 
that foreseeability is the sum and substance of intervening 
causation. The fact that such cases refer to foreseeability does 
not mean that those cases define the scope and breadth of 
intervening causation. Those cases merely focused on one element 
of causation (foreseeability) necessary to decide the particular 
cases before the court. It was simply unnecessary for the court 
to cite and analyze every segment of intervening causation to 
decide those cases. Further, the parties probably briefed only 
the foreseeability factor in their appeals. Accordingly, the 
cases were decided on that basis only. 
The Utah Supreme Court has, in fact, adopted all of 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §447. Harris v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). 
For complete text, see Appendix 1. 
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Foreseeability is only a part of §447i8 intervening 
causation analysis. The intervening causation factors in §447 
include, (a) foreseeability of Ostler's conduct; (b) whether a 
reasonable man would regard father Ostler\s conduct as 
extraordinary; (c) whether Ostler's conduct was a normal 
consequence of the situation created by Wheeler. These are 
disjunctive; if any one of the three is applicable, there is 
liability. These factors are not merely t^ hree different ways of 
saying foreseeability. 
Section 447 presents two approaches. Factor (a) is 
viewed prospectively. Factors (b) and (cj are viewed retro-
spectively. Neither (b) nor (c) require foreseeability; instead, 
they operate in the absence of foreseeability. The jury was told 
to view the matter only prospectively, i.q., from Wheeler's 
viewpoint before the accident. This was What Wheeler's counsel 
argued. The jury never got the chance to analyze the case under 
(b) and (c), i.e., looking at the accident after the fact. 
Ostler further pointed out that part of the court's 
instruction stated that the chain of causa|tion was broken "if the 
actions of Stephen Ostler in causing the cbllision were. . .not 
reasonably to be foreseen." (R. 2958-2959i. ) This instruction 
tells the jury to focus on the foreseeability of Stephen Ostler's 
*-°For complete text, see Appendix 2. 
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specific conduct, not the foreseeability of a generalized risk of 
harm to passing motorists. This is directly contrary to Rees v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978), which states: 
What is necessary to meet the test of 
negligence and proximate cause is that it be 
reasonably foreseeable, not that the 
particular accident would occur, but only 
that there is a likelihood of an occurrence 
of the same general nature. 
Wheeler simply ignores this error; instead he substitutes 
glittering adjectives ("carefully," "insightful,") about the 
court's instruction in place of legal analysis • 
POINT THIRTEEN 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT WHEELER'S 
PARKING WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION 
Ostler pointed out in his opening brief that proximate 
causation was present in this case as a matter of law. This is 
because Wheeler's negligence i£ parking alongside the freeway 
created a risk of harm to passengers in passing cars. The harm 
that occurred arose from one of the risks that made Wheeler 
negligent in the first place. Because the harm that actually 
occurred was within the scope of the risk created by Wheeler's 
negligence, the subsequent negligence of father Ostler does not 
break the chain of causation. Restatement of Torts, 2d, §442A, 
42 
§442B and §449.iy Wheeler does not deny that the risk of 
collision with a negligent passing motori$t is one of the risks 
that made Wheeler negligent. 
The only factual ground Wheeler suggests for a lack of 
proximate causation is to say "all the driver of the plaintiff's 
vehicle had to do was. . .not remove his tar from the lane of 
traffic until it was safe to do so." (Re$pondent's Brief, at p. 
58-59.) This response simply says to place all of the fault on 
the later negligent actor. Under the Restatement, that is no 
defense: 
If the likelihood that a third person may act 
in a particular manner is the hazard or one 
of the hazards which makes the actor 
negligent, such an act whether innocent, 
negligent, intentionally tortious, or 
criminal does not prevent the aqtor from 
being liable for harm caused thereby. 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §449. 
Wheeler's final claim is that if the Court adopts §449, 
it will make §447 superfluous or purposeless. Of course the 
drafters of the Restatement did not think so. The comment in 
Clause (a) of §447 makes clear that §449 applies if the risk that 
a passing motorist will stray into the recovery lane is one of 
the risks that made Wheeler negligent. Acpording to the Comment, 
For complete text, see Appendix 3. 
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§447 would apply if Wheeler's parking was negligent as to other 
persons or risks, not including Ostler. 
Wheeler asserts that the Restatement rules "make a 
determination of negligence merge with a causation such that 
negligence would always be causation," (Respondent's Brief, at 
59.) This response fundamentally misunderstands the Restatement 
rules of proximate causation. There may still be negligence 
without causation, but only if none of the tests of §447 are met. 
Wheeler's main argument is that proximate cause is a 
jury question, if reasonable minds could disagree. Ostler 
agrees,, However, in this case, reasonable minds could not 
disagree on causation. 
If the facts are undisputed, it is usually 
the duty of the court to apply to them any 
rule which determines the existence or extent 
of the negligent actor's liability. 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §453, Comment (b). In this case the 
facts were essentially undisputed; father Ostler negligently 
drove into the back of a truck negligently parked on the side of 
the freeway. It was the duty of the trial court to apply the 
rules of §442A, §442B and §449 to these undisputed facts. A 
correct application of these basic doctrines to these undisputed 
facts yields a conclusion of concurrent proximate causation. 
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POINT FOURTEEN 
TWO RECENT CASES OF THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT ARE IMPORTANT WITH 
RESPECT TO THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE THEORY 
Ostler's brief claims that the trial court should have 
permitted an amendment to claim punitive damages. (Substitute 
Brief of Appellant at p. 38.) Respondent generally argues that 
there was not enough evidence to support £ claim for punitive 
damages. (Brief of Respondent at p. 40.) 
After plaintiff's opening brief was filed, the Supreme 
Court issued two landmark decisions on the issue of punitive 
damages. Johnson v. Rogers, P.2d
 (_f 90 UAR 3 (1988); 
and Miskin v. Carter, 761 P.2d 1378, 90 UAR 19 (1988). 
Both Johnson and Miskin confirm the standard for 
awarding punitive damages in Utah: 
The standard for punitive damages in non-
false imprisonment cases is thus clear: They 
may be imposed for conduct that is willful 
and malicious or that manifests la knowing and 
reckless indifference and disregard toward 
the rights of others. 
Johnson v. Rogers, 90 UAR at p. 4. Compaiie Miskin v. Carter, 90 
UAR at p. 20. 
However, both Johnson and Miskin reached different 
results based upon the specific facts of each case. 
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Johnson involved a claim for punitive damages from 
drunk driving. The statutory presumption for drunk driving is 
•08. The defendant in Johnson had a blood alcohol level of ,18 
along with other aggravating circumstances. In Johnson, those 
facts did justify the claim for punitive damages. 
Miskin also involved a claim for punitive damages for 
drunk driving. However, in Miskin the defendant's blood alcohol 
level was .08—exactly the statutory minimum for drunk driving. 
There were no other aggravating circumstances in Miskin. In 
Miskin, punitive damages were not allowed. 
Taken together, these two cases support the following 
proposition: Where a statute is passed for public safety, 
punitive damages will not be allowed if there is only a 
borderline violation with no aggravating circumstances. However, 
where a statute is passed for public safety, punitive damages 
will be allowed where there is a grave violation of that statute 
with aggravating circumstances. 
In the instant case, the drive-time regulations were 
regulations requiring truck drivers to have a certain amount of 
rest or sleep before the driver can drive on the highway. These 
are generally referred to as the 10-Hour Rule, the 15-Hour Rule, 
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and the 70-Hour Rule.^u These regulations were specifically 
passed to get exhausted and impaired drivers off the road. (R. 
2132.) 
The preferred testimony is that Wheeler was 25.25 hours 
over his 10-hour limit; 26.75 hours over his 15-hour limit; and 
86.25 hours over the 70-hour limit. (R. 2133.) The proferred 
testimony is also that the symptoms for fatigue and alcohol 
consumption are synonymous. (R. 2261.) Finally, there are 
aggravating circumstances. Wheeler's driving logs were kept 
fraudulently. These driving logs are required by Federal law. 
(R. 2135.) Moreover, the employer (Albina) knew perfectly well 
of the violations, and in some sense aided and abetted Wheeler in 
driving overtime. (R. 2134-35.) 
Suppose that an airline pilot flew his plane while 
drunk, and that a crash occurred. Obviously, there would be 
little difficulty in a claim for punitive damages. However, 
suppose that an airline pilot falsified his time records and flew 
while exhausted. Suppose the pilot then went to sleep and a 
crash occurred. There should still be no difficulty in awarding 
punitive damages. The evidence in this case is that the 
symptoms for driving drunk or driving while exhausted are 
zuFor text of these regulations, see Brief of Appellant at 
p. 8 & 9. 
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identical. (R. 2261.) Theoretically, there should be no 
difference in result whether the crash is caused by an airline 
pilot or a truck driver. Nor should there be any difference 
whether the crash is caused by drunk driving or driving while 
exhausted and in violation of government safety regulations. 
POINT FIFTEEN 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW 
THE FOUNDATION FOR OSTLER'S 
VIDEOTAPE EXPERIMENT ON A DE NOVO BASIS 
Ostler's brief argued that a videotape re-creation of 
the accident should have been received into evidence. (Substi-
tute Brief of Appellant at p. 48.) Wheeler responded that there 
was not a sufficient foundation for the video. (Brief of 
Respondent at 
p. 50.) 
However, Wheeler's brief fails to respond to Short v. 
G.M.C., 320 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. App. 1984). (Compare Brief of 
Appellant at p. 51.) Short holds that an appellate court should 
treat this issue as a matter of law. In order to assist this 
court in ruling on foundation, Ostler will utilize a portion of 
his time during oral argument to preview the video for the court. 
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Wheeler likewise failed to respond to Ostler's argument 
that different standards apply if the video is used for 
illustrative purposes, or if the video is used for substantive 
testimony. (Compare Substitute Brief of Appellant at p. 51.) 
Also, Wheeler fails to respond to Ostler's argument 
that any differences in detail between the actual accident and 
the experiment go to weight, not admissibility. (Compare 
Substitute Brief of Appellant at p. 54-55.) See also Jenkins v. 
Snohomish County Public Utility, 713 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986). 
Use of demonstrative evidence has been 
encouraged if it accurately illustrates the 
facts sought to be proved. The evidence must 
be relevant by being material and probative. 
Admission of demonstrative evidence is within 
the trial court's discretion. The conditions 
of the experiment must be substantially 
similar to those of the event at issue, but 
any dissimilarity goes to the weight of the 
evidence, to be evaluated by the jury. 
Id. at 84. (Emphasis added.) 
Wheeler's attack relates to a single issue. The video 
shows that the Ostler pickup would have rolled harmlessly into 
the desert if the truck had not been illegally parked. Wheeler 
argues that it is only speculation that the pickup would have 
gone into the desert. (Brief of Respondent at p. 51.) 
However, there is one living eyewitness to the 
accident (Wheeler). Within hours after the accident, Wheeler 
gave the following statement: 
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Did it look like the way this vehicle 
was coming when you viewed him in the 
rear view mirror that he might have been 
going to sleep? 
A. That's exactly what it looked like to 
me. I mean, he just, if 1 hadn't been 
there, I think he would have just 
ran (sic) out into the desert. 
(R. 2166 and 2167.) 
This case is not unlike Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 814 
F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1987): 
Champeau challenges the admission of a 
videotaped experiment into evidence at the 
second trial. The experiment showed that if 
the driver of a tractor-trailer rig traveling 
thirty-five miles per hour took his foot off 
of the accelerator one-quarter mile from the 
curve that was the scene of the accident and 
never accelerated again, the rig would coast 
to a stop short of the curve. The purpose of 
the experiment was not to recreate the 
accident, but to take Champeau's distance and 
speed estimates and show that under the 
applicable laws of physics the accident could 
not have occurred as Champeau had described. 
Moreover, the experiment did not need to be 
performed in similar circumstances in order 
to be admissible because it did not purport 
to be a recreation of the accident and it was 
merely used to demonstrate general principles 
of physics as applied to Champeau's 
testimony. 
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See Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213, 223 (7th Cir. 1974); 
Harkins v. Ford Motor Co., 437 F.2d 276, 278 & n.5 (3d Cir. 
1970) . 
Thus, there was testimony in the record that father 
Ostler would have rolled harmlessly into the desert if the truck 
had not been illegally parked. Therefore, there was foundation 
to show the jury how the Ostler vehicle v^ ould have responded 
under that scenario. 
POINT SIXTEEN 
QUESTIONS RELATING TO 
INSURANCE ARE PROPER ON VOIR DIRE 
Ostler argued that the trial court excluded numerous 
questions regarding "tort reform propaganda." (Substitute Brief 
of Appellant, at p. 45-48.) Ostler's general response is that it 
is improper to inject the issue of insurance into the trial. 
Ostler concedes that it is normally improper to inject 
evidence of insurance during the trial. However, the rule is 
otherwise during voir dire. In fact, it has long been the policy 
in Utah to permit questions on insurance during voir dire. Balle 
v. Smith, 81 Utah 179; 17 P.2d 224 (1932); Tjas v. Proctor, 591 
P.2d 438 (Utah 1979). Indeed, the standard J.I.F.U. instruction 
indicates thatvmatter# of an interest in an insurance company, 
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". . .is perhaps better handled during the voir dire examination 
of the jury." (J.I.F.U. §3.8, Note.) 
Although this issue arises from time-to-time, there has 
never been a more egregious case in Utah or any other state. On 
the very eve of trialf the insurance carrier representing 
defendant (Farmers) sent a propaganda blitz to its policy 
holders. This propaganda blitz told how plaintiff lawyers make 
too much money, and cause insurance rates to go up. (R. 1992. 
Compare Exhibit 5 to this Brief.) Ostler's proposed voir dire 
question was very innocent. Ostler merely asked if any of the 
veniremen were insured by Farmers. (R. 1423, para. 37.) 
If this case passes muster, Farmers might buy a full-
page newspaper advertisement with the same message just before 
the next big trial. Or perhaps, Farmers will simply slip a copy 
of the advertisement under the door of the jury room. 
Insurance companies are making a concerted effort to 
pre-condition juries. If it doesn't stop here--where then? 
Wheeler's response is that the court did ask what 
magazines the veniremen subscribed to. (R„ 1420 §4.) Wheeler 
says that the information about the tainted "insurance reform 
propaganda" would have come out in response to that question. 
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 45-46.) 
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Wheeler's response is not in good faith. The magazine 
(or perhaps, more accurately the flyer or booklet) titled, 
"Friendly Exchange" comes to all policyholders of Farmers. No 
one "subscribes" to it, and no one pays for it. There was simply 
no way to elicit that information other than to ask which of the 
veniremen were insured by Farmers. 
CONCLUSION 
Ostler seeks a directed verdict against Wheeler on the 
issue of proximate cause. In the alternative, Ostler seeks a new 
trial at which the trial court will properly admit evidence, 
permit proper impeachment, and correctly instruct the jury on 
proximate cause and disallow misstatements of law by opposing 
counsel. If the case is remanded for a new trial, Ostler should 
be permitted to add a claim for punitive damages. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Ch- 16 LEGAL CAUSE § 442 
but because of the careless packing of the truck, it causes a heavy 
piece of machinery to fall on a pedestrian, the act of B is an 
independent intervening force* 
Comment on Subsection (2): 
d. The active operation of an intervening force may or may 
not be a superseding cause which relieves the actor from liability 
for another's harm occurring thereafter. Whether it has this 
effect is determined by the rules stated in §§ 442-453. A force 
due to an act of a third person which is wrongful toward the 
other who is harmed may be only a contributory factor in pro-
ducing the harm. If so, both the actor and the third person are 
concurrently liable. This is true although the actor's conduct 
has ceased to operate actively and has merely created a con-
dition which is made harmful by the operation of the intervening 
force set in motion by the third person's negligent or otherwise 
wrongful conduct. However, while there is concurrent liability, 
the two forces are not concurrent causes as that term is cus-
tomarily used. To be a concurrent cause, the effects of the neg-
ligent conduct of both the actor and the third person must be in 
active and substantially simultaneous operation. (See § 439.) 
§ 4 4 2 . Considerations Important in Determining Whether an 
Intervening Force is a Superseding Cause 
The following considerations are of importance in deter-
mining whether an intervening force is a superseding 
cause of harm to another: 
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm 
different in kind from that which would otherwise have 
resulted from the actor's negligence; 
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences 
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather 
than norpial in view of the circumstances existing at the 
time of its operation; 
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating 
independently of any situation created by the actor's 
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal 
result of such a situation; 
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening 
force is due to a third person's act or to his failure to 
act; 
So* Appendix for Reporter'* Rotes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an 
act of a third person which is wrongful toward the 
other and as such subjects the third person t|o liability 
to him; 
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a 
third person which sets the intervening force in motion. 
Comment on Clause (a): 
a. As to the statement in Clause (a), see £ 45L 
Comment on Clause (b): 
6- As to the statement in Clause (b), see $ 435 (2) and 
Comments c and d. 
Comment on Clause (cj : 
c. As to the statement in Clause (c), see §& 443-449. 
d. The words "situation created by the actors negligence" 
are used to denote the fact that the actor's negligent conduct 
is a substantial factor in bringing about the situation and that, 
therefore, the actor would be liable for creating the situation 
if the situation were in itself a legal injury. 
Comment on Clause (d): 
e. As to the statement in Clause (d), see §452. 
Comment on Clause (e) : 
/ . As to the statement in Clause (e), see §§447-449. 
Comment on (Jause (f): 
g. As to the statement in Clause (f), compare § 447 with 
§§ 448 and 449. 
§ 4 4 2 A . Intervening Force Risked by Actor's Conduct 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or in-
creases the foreseeable risk of harm through the inter-
vention of another force, and is a substantial factor in 
causing the harm, such intervention is not a superseding 
cause. 
iSw1 Reporter's Notes. 
See Appendix for Reporter'! Votes, Court Citations, and Crow Reference* 
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§ 4 4 6 TORTS, SECOND Ou 16 
way and thrown across the sidewalk by an unidentified person 
who has obviously done so in order to make it possible for 
him to use the driveway as a means of reaching B's house. 
Thereafter, C, lawfully using the sidewalk of the road as a 
guest of B, runs into the barrier in the dark and puts out his 
eye. The throwing of the barriers on the sidewalk by the 
unidentified man is not a superseding cause of B's barm. 
6. If the efforts of one whose right or privilege fs impeded 
to remove the impediment or to exercise his right oi: privilege 
notwithstanding its existence results in harm to a third person, 
there is, in addition to the question of causation, the question 
whether the actor's conduct is negligent toward the third person, 
as to which see §445, Comment c. 
§ 4 4 7 . Negligence of Intervening Acts 
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is 
negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does 
not make it a superseding cause of harm to ahother 
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about, if 
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct 
should have realized that a third person might so act, or 
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing 
when the act of the third person was done would kiot re-
gard it as highly extraordinary that the third person 
had so acted, or 
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a 
situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner 
in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent. 
See Reporter's Notes, 
Comment on Clause (a): 
a. The statement in Clause (a) applies wherd there is a 
realizable likelihood of such an act but the likelihood is not 
enough in itself to make the actor's conduct negligent, the con-
duct being negligent because of other and greater risks which 
it entails. If the realizable likelihood that a third person will 
act in the negligent manner in which a particular third person 
acts is so great as to be the risk or even one of the risks which 
make the actor's conduct unreasonably dangerous and therefore 
negligent, the case is governed by the rule stated in § 449. 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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Illustration: 
1. A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight jolt 
might cause its heavy contents to fall from it. He parks 
it in a street where to his knowledge small boys congregate 
for play. B, one of these boys, tries to climb on the truck. 
In so doing he so disturbs the load as to cause a heavy article 
to fall upon and hurt C, a comrade standing close by. B's 
act is not a superseding cause of C's harm. 
Comment on Clause (b) : 
&. The actor at the time of his negligence may have no 
reason to realize that a third person might act in the particular 
negligent manner in which the particular third person acts, 
because his mind is not centered upon the sequence of events 
which may result from his act and therefore he has no reason 
to realize that it will create the situation which the third person's 
intervening act makes harmful. However, when the situation 
is known to exist, the likelihood that some negligent act may 
make it dangerous may be easily realizable or even obvious. 
Illustration: 
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that A 
does not intentionally park his car in the street frequented 
by the boys, but his car through no fault of his is blocked 
in a traffic congestion at this point. B's act in meddling 
with the truck is not a superseding cause of C's harm. 
Comment on Clause (c ) : 
c. The word "normal" is used in the sense stated in § 443J 
Comment b. It, therefore, denotes that the court or jury looking 
at the matter after the event and knowing the situation which 
existed when the act was done, including the character of the 
person subjected to the stimulus of the situation, would not 
regard it as extraordinary that such an act, though negligent! 
should have been done. 
d. The words "situation created by the actor's negligencel' 
are used in the sense stated in § 442, Comment d. 
e. The words "extraordinarily negligent" denote the fact 
that men of ordinary experience and reasonable judgment, IOOK-
ing at the matter after the event and taking into account the 
prevalence of that "occasional negligence, which is one of the 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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incidents of human life," would not regard it as extraordinary 
that the third person's intervening act should have been done 
in the negligent manner in which it was done. Since the third 
person's action is a product of the actor's negligent conduct, 
there is good reason for holding him responsible for its effects, 
even though it be done in a negligent manner, unless thq nature 
or extent of the negligence is altogether unusual. 
/ . The statement in Clause (c) applies to any negligent 
act which is a normal consequence of a situation which the actor's 
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in creating (seej§§ 443-
446). 
g. While the fact that such an intervening act of la third 
person is negligent does not prevent the actor's negligent conduct 
from being a legal cause of the harm resulting therefrom to 
another, the negligence of the act may be so great or the third 
person's conduct so reckless as to make it appear an extraor-
dinary response to the situation created by the actor anil there-
fore a superseding cause of the other's harm. 
h. The rule stated in this Section applies to acts doi^ e either 
by the person who is harmed or by a third person. If 
is done by the injured person and is done in a negligent 
it does not prevent the actor's negligence from being 
cause of his harm, but it constitutes contributory fault which 
precludes him from recovering from the negligent actor (see 
§ 467). If it is done by a third person, he, as well as tfie actor 
whose negligence has created the situation, is liable to 
injured by it. 
the act 
fanner, 
a legal 
another 
§ 4 4 8 . Intentionally Tortious or Criminal Acts Don£ Under 
Opportunity Afforded by Actor's Negligence 
The act of a third person in committing an intentional 
tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another 
resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent con-
duct created a situation which afforded an opportunity 
to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless 
the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or 
should have realized the likelihood that such a situation 
might be created, and that a third person might avail 
himself of the opportunity to commit such a tor^ or 
crime. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
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(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an 
act of a third person which is wrongful toward the 
other and as such subjects the third person tp liability 
to him; 
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a 
third person which sets the intervening force in motion. 
Comment on Clause (a): . 
a. As to the statement in Clause (a), see § 45L 
Comment on Clause (b): 
6. As to the statement in Clause (b), see j§ 435 (2) and 
Comments c and d. 
Comment on Clause (c): 
c. As to the statement in Clause (c), see §& 443-449. 
d. The words "situation created by the actolr's negligence* 
are used to denote the fact that the actor's negligent conduct 
is a substantial factor in bringing about the situation and that, 
therefore, the actor would be liable for creating the situation 
if the situation were in itself a legal injury. 
Comment on Clause (d): 
e. As to the statement in Clause (d), see (§ 452. 
Comment on Clause (e) : 
/ . As to the statement in Clause (e), se0 §§ 447-449. 
Comment on Clause ( f ) : 
g. As to the statement in Clause (f), compare § 447 with 
§§448 and 449. 
§ 4 4 2 A . Intervening Force Risked by Actor's Conduct 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or in-
creases the foreseeable risk of harm througlji the inter-
vention of another force, and is a substantial factor in 
causing the harm, such intervention is not a superseding 
cause. 
Sw Reporter's Notes. 
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Comment: 
a. The rule stated in this Section applies to any interven-
ing force, whether it be a force of nature, or the act of a human 
being, or of an animal. 
b. Where the negligence of the actor has created the risk 
of harm to another because of the likelihood of such intervention, 
the actor is not relieved of responsibility merely because the 
risk which he has created has in fact been fulfilled. The same 
is true where there is already some existing risk or possibility 
of the intervention, but the negligence of the actor has increased 
the risk of such intervention, or of harm if it occurs. 
Illustration: 
1. In the month of December A voluntarily ships 
potatoes in an unheated car of B Railroad through the state 
of New York. B Railroad negligently delays the shipment 
for three days, thereby increasing the already existing
 ri sk 
that the potatoes will be damaged by cold. During the extra 
three days severe cold weather sets in, and damages the 
potatoes. B Railroad is subject to liability to A. 
§ 4 4 2 B , Intervening Force Causing Same Harm as Th it 
Risked by Actor's Conduct 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or in-
creases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial 
factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is 
brought about through the intervention of another fores 
does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the 
harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is 
not within the scope of the risk created by the actor's 
conduct. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment:: 
a- The rule stated in this Section is a special application 
of the principle stated in § 435 (1), that the fact that the actor 
neither foresaw nor could have foreseen the manner in which 
a particular harm is brought about does not prevent his lia-
bility where the other conditions necessary to it exist. Compare 
Illustration 1 under that Section. 
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4. The same facts as in Illustration 3, except that the 
pole is knocked over by a cow's bumping into it. The same 
result. 
5. A negligently leaves an excavation in a public side-
walk, creating the risk that a traveler on the sidewalk will 
fall into it. B, passing C on the sidewalk, negligently bumps 
into him, and knocks him into the excavation. A is subject 
to liability to C. 
6. The A Railroad negligently derails a tank car full 
of gasoline and damages it, so that gasoline runs into the 
public street. The risk is thus created that persons using 
the street will be injured by fire or explosion. B, a bystander, 
negligently strikes a match to light his cigar. The gasoline 
vapor is ignited, and the resulting flash of fire injures C, a 
pedestrian on the sidewalk. A Railroad is subject to lia-
bility to C. 
e. Intentionally tortious or criminal acts. The rule stated 
in this Section does not apply where the harm of which the risk 
has been created or increased by the actor's conduct is brought 
about by the intervening act of a third person which is inten-
tionally tortious or criminal, and is not within the scope of the 
risk created by the original negligence. Such tortious or criminal 
acts may in themselves be foreseeable, and so within the scope 
of the created risk, in which case the actor may still be liable 
for the harm, under the rules stated in §§ 448 and 449. But if 
they are not, the actor is relieved of responsibility by the inter-
vention of the third person. The reason usually given by the 
courts is that in such a case the third person has deliberately 
assumed control of the situation, and all responsibility for the 
consequences of his act is shifted to him. (Compare § 452 (2).) 
Illustrations: 
7. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that B 
deliberately kicks C into the excavation. A is not liable to 
C. 
8. The same facts as in Illustration 6, except that B 
deliberately sets fire to the gasoline to see what will happen. 
A Railroad is not liable to C. 
9. The employees of the A Theatre Company negli-
gently leave a chair on the railing of the balcony, creating 
the risk that it may accidentally or negligently be knocked 
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6. If the actor's conduct has created or increased the risk 
that a particular harm to the plaintiff will occur, and has been 
a substantial factor in causing that harm, it is immaterial to the 
actor's liability that the harm is brought about| 
which no one in his position could possibly have 
m a manner 
been expected 
to foresee or anticipate. This is true not only where the result 
is produced by the direct operation of the actor's conduct upon 
conditions or circumstances existing at the time, but also where 
it is brought about through the intervention oij other forces 
which the actor could not have expected, whether 
of nature, or the actions of animals, or those of | 
which are not intentionally tortious or criminal. 
phey be forces 
third persons 
tThis is to say 
that any harm which is in itself foreseeable, as to which the actor 
has created or increased the recognizable risk, is klways "prox-
imate," no matter how it is brought about, except where there 
is such intentionally tortious or criminal intervention, and it is 
not within thescope-of the risk created by the original negligent 
conduct. 
Illustrations: 
1. A negligently fails to clean petroleutti residue out 
of his oil barge moored at a dock, thus creating the risk 
of harm to others in the vicinity through firi or explosion 
of gasoline vapor. The barge is struck by |ightning and 
explodes, injuring B, a workman on the dock. A is subject 
to liability to B. 
2. A negligently leaves an obstruction lin the public 
highway, creating the risk that those using the highway 
will be injured by collision with it. B's horse runs away 
with him and charges into the obstruction, and B is injured. 
A is subject to liability to B. 
3. The A Telephone Company negligently allows its 
telephone pole, adjoining the public sidewalk but several feet 
from the street, to become riddled with termites, thus cre-
ating the risk that the pole will fall or be knocked over and 
so injure some person using the sidewalk. An automobile 
negligently driven by B at excessive speed leaves the high-
way, comes up on the sidewalk, and knocks the pole over. 
It falls up C, a pedestrian on the sidewalk, anq injures him. 
A is subject to liability to C. 
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Railroad Company is a legal cause of the loss of tfye cider 
by the theft of the unknown persons. 
c. When actor's negligence consists in creating \risk of 
criminal action by third person. The actor's conduct may be 
negligent solely because he should have recognized that it would 
expose the person, land, or chattels, of another to an unreasonable 
risk of criminal aggression. If so, it necessarily follows that 
the fact that the harm is done by such criminal aggression can-
not relieve the actor from liability (see §449). However, it 
is not necessary that the conduct should be negligent solely 
because of its tendency to afford an oportunity for a third person 
to commit the crime. It is enough that the actor should have 
realized the likelihood that his conduct would create a temptation 
which would be likely to lead to its commission. 
This is true although the likelihood that such a crim^ would 
be committed might not be of itself enough to make the I actor's 
conduct negligent, and the negligent character of the act arises 
from the fact that it involves other risks which of themselves 
are enough to make it unreasonable, or from such risks together 
with the possibility of crime. 
§ 4 4 9 . Tortious or Criminal Acts the Probability of Which 
Makes Actor's Conduct Negligent 
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a par-
ticular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which 
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, 
negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not 
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused 
thereby. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. This Section should be read together with § 302 IB, and 
'che Comments to that Section, which deal with the foreseeable 
likelihood of the intentional or even criminal misconduct of a 
third person as a hazard which makes the actor's conduct; negli-
gent. As is there stated, the mere possibility or even likelihood 
that there may be such misconduct is not in all cases sufficient 
to characterize the actor's conduct as negligence. It is only where 
the actor is under a duty to the other, because of some relation 
between them, to protect him against such misconduct, or where 
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the actor has undertaken the obligation of doing so, or his conduct 
has created or increased the risk of harm through the mis-
conduct, that he becomes negligent. 
b. The happening of the very event the likelihood of which 
makes the actor's conduct negligent and so subjects the actor 
to liability cannot relieve him from liability. The duty to re-
frain from the act committed or to do the act omitted is imposed 
to protect the other from this very danger. To deny recovery 
because the other's exposure to the very risk from which it 
was the purpose of the duty to protect him resulted in harm 
to him, would be to deprive the other of all protection and to 
make the duty a nullity. 
Illustrations: 
1. A is traveling on the train of the B Railway Com-
pany. Her ticket entitles her to ride only to Station X, 
but she intentionally stays on the train after it has passed 
that station. When she arrives at Station Y the conductor 
puts her off the train. This occurs late at night after the 
station has been closed and the attendants have departed. 
The station is situated in a lonely district, and the only 
way in which she can reach the neighboring town is by pass-
ing a place where to the knowledge of the conductor there 
is a construction camp. The construction crew is known to 
contain many persons of vicious character. While attempt-
ing to pass by this camp, A is attacked and ravished by 
some of the construction crew. The B Railway Company 
is subject to liability to A. 
2. The A Railway Company permits a number of 
drunken rowdies to ride in its day coach. No effort is made 
by the conductor or train crew to eject them, although their 
conduct is insulting and threatening to the other passengers. 
One of the rowdies attempts to take liberties with B, a 
female passenger, and in the scuffle harms her. The inten-
tional misconduct of the rowdy is not a superseding cause 
of B's harm. 
3. The train crew of the coal trains of the A Railway 
Company are in the habit of throwing out coal to their 
families as the train passes through the streets of a village. 
The Company knows of this practice but takes no steps 
to prevent it. B, while walking on the street, is injured 
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by coal so thrown from one of the Company's t rai ls . The 
trainman's act in throwing out the coal without looking to 
see whether there was anyone likely to be hit by it is not 
a superseding cause of B's harm. 
c. Section 294 states in substance that an act or Amission 
which negligently puts a third person in peril subjects the actor to 
liability to others who are led by their perception of the third 
person's peril to bring themselves within reach of the dangerous 
effect of the actor's conduct. It is an obvious corollary of this rule 
that the act of the other in voluntarily going to the rescue of 
the third person cannot be a superseding cause which prevents 
the actor's conduct from being the-legal cause of harm which 
the other sustains while attempting the rescue and therefore 
relieve the actor from liability. So also, there are many pre-
cautions, such as locking a door or substituting an alternative 
barrier where a gap is lawfully made in the wall of a building 
or room, which are designed to protect the chattels contained 
in the building or room from theft. The fact that tne thief's 
act in taking advantage of the opportunity is criminal does 
not make it a superseding cause of the loss of the stolen | chattels. 
§ 4 5 0 . Harm Increased or Accelerated by Extraordinary Force 
of Nature 
The extraordinary operation of a force of nature, which 
merely increases or accelerates harm to another which 
would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligent 
conduct, does not prevent the actor from being liable for 
such harm. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. If the actor's conduct is negligent because itl involves 
a risk of a particular sort of harm to others, the fact that an 
extraordinary operation of a natural force causes harm of such 
a sort to occur earlier or to be greater in extent than that which 
would have occurred but for its intervention does not relieve 
the actor from responsibility for the harm which actually results 
from his negligence, if it is substantially impossible to separate 
the harm which has been done from that which would have 
occurred without the intervention of the force of nature. 
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TITLE B. RULES WHICH DETERMINE THE RESPON-
SIBILITY OF A NEGLIGENT ACTOR FOR HARM 
WHICH HIS CONDUCT IS A SUBSTANTIAL 
FACTOR IN PRODUCING 
Introductory Note: Only a few of the Sections in this Topic 
state rules which restrict liability short of holding the actor for 
all the harm of which his negligence is a substantial cause. The 
majority of the Sections state either (1) that certain factors, 
such as the fact that the actor had no reason to foresee that the 
other would be harmed in the precise manner in which the harm 
was sustained, are not sufficient to relieve the actor from liability, 
or state (2) rules which determine the extent of liability in 
certain types of constantly recurring situations. Indeed, the re-
strictive rules are in almost every instance stated as being ex-
ceptions to rules which permit recovery or are stated as being 
subject to exceptions permitting recovery. 
§ 4 3 5 * Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of Its Occurrence 
(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in 
bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor 
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of 
the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not 
prevent him from being liable. 
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal 
cause of harm to another where after the event and 
looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent con-
duct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it 
should have brought about the harm. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. The fact that the actor, at the time of his negligent 
conduct, neither realized nor should have realized that it might 
cause harm to another of the particular kind or in the particular 
manner in which the harm has in fact occurred, is not of itself 
sufficient to prevent him from being liable for the other's harm 
if his conduct was negligent toward the other and was a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the harm. However, the manner 
in which the harm occurs may involve the cooperation of other 
assisting factors so numerous and so important that the actor's 
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negligence cannot be regarded as a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm. (See §433, Clause (a).) 
Negligent conduct may result in unforeseeable harmi to an-
other, (1) because the actor neither knows nor should lJnow of 
the situation upon which his negligence operates, or (2) because 
a second force the operation of which he had no reason to an-
ticipate has been a contributing cause in bringing abc^ut the 
harm. In neither case does the unforeseeable nature of the 
event necessarily prevent the actor's liability. 
Illustrations: 
1. The A Company operates a private railroad line on 
its own land. This line is curved and crosses the line of the 
B Railroad at two points. As the A Company's line ap-
proaches the western intersection the view of trains ap-
proaching from the west is obscured by a hill so that no 
view of approaching trains can be had until a short distance 
before the crossing is reached. C, the engineer of a 'fdinky" 
engine of the A Company, drives the engine toward the 
western intersection at so high a rate of speed that, when 
the engine gets past the hill and the engineer has a view 
of the B Company's track and sees a train approaching 
thereon, he is unable to stop the engine in time to ivoid a 
collision with the train. He attempts to do so by reversing 
the engine. Seeing that this is going to be ineffectual, 
he shuts off the steam and jumps. In so doing the engineer 
is acting as a reasonable man would in such an emergency. 
The engine is slowed down considerably, so that, although 
it collides with the B Company's train, it does no damage 
except that it derails the wheels of one of the cars. The jar 
of the collision, however, releases the throttle of the 'jdinky" 
engine. The "dinky" engine being in reverse, backs and 
gathers momentum as it approaches the eastern intersec-
tion of the two lines. The derailment of the car of B s train 
causes the engineer to slow up and stop across the eastern 
intersection, where the "dinky" engine crashes into ^nother 
car of the B Company's train in which D is seated as a 
passenger, causing him serious harm. A jury may hold the 
negligence of A's engineer in driving the engine toward 
the intersection at too high a rate of speed to be a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the injury sustained at the 
second intersection, although at the time the engineer did 
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so no one would have expected a collision at that point to 
occur in that manner. If the jury so finds, the fact that 
the engineer had no reason to expect the second collision 
does not prevent the A Company from being liable. 
2. The A Gas Company negligently permits its gas 
main to fall into a leaky condition. The gas permeates the 
earth and enters a conduit through which the wires of 
an electric light company pass through the building of B. 
This conduit has two outlets through B's cellar. One of 
them is used for electric lights. The other is not used and 
is capped with an iron cap. C, a servant of B, perceives a 
slight smell of gas. He calls in C, the fire marshal of the 
town, who is passing at the time. They go to the cellar. 
While the fire marshal is standing in front of the capped 
outlet, C tests the other outlet by applying a match to the 
point where he thinks there may be a slight leak. The flame 
ignites the gas in this outlet which goes back to the con-
duit, causing an explosion the force of which hurls the cap 
from the unused outlet with such force as to kill C, standing 
in front of it. If the negligence of the A Gas Company is 
found to be a substantial factor in bringing about C's death, 
the A Gas Company is subject to liability. 
3. A steamer of the A Line while approaching a bridge 
is so negligently navigated that it bumps into the bridge 
with sufficient force to throw down and injure men whom the 
captain saw working there. The impact causes the death 
of B in the following manner: B is a workman who was 
engaged in repairing the pilings of the bridge but was not 
seen by the captain. He was at work upon a plank the two 
ends of which were forced in between the pilings which 
supported the dock and kept in place by the tendency of 
the pilings to come together. The impact of the vessel 
caused the pilings to spring apart. This caused the plank 
and B to fall. The plank being thus removed, the pilings 
came together, crushing B to death. The A Line is subject 
to liability for B's death. 
Comment: 
&. On the other hand, if the actor should have realized 
that his conduct might cause harm to another in substantially the 
manner in which it is brought about, the harm is universally re-
garded as the legal consequence of the actor's negligence. This 
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YOU Pay for Plaintiffs' Lawyers 
P laintiffs' attorneys, who file lawsuits on behalf of injured 
persons, often call the contingency 
fee they charge the key to the 
courthouse door. A contingency 
fee is an amount of money a 
person agrees to pay an attorney 
for services in conducting a 
lawsuit and is usually a percentage of the amount 
recovered. Plaintiffs' attorneys say the contingency fee 
allows everyone access to the courts—no matter how 
poor they are—because the plaintiff does not need 
money to file a suit. The fee is based on an attorney 
winning an award for the client. If the client loses, the 
attorney receives no pay. 
Contigency system spawns suits 
Now with plaintiffs' attorneys claiming up to one-half 
of the damages awarded to their clients, the 
contingency fee is under attack. Many believe the 
contingency fee system is a prime reason for the 
increase in both lie size and number of lawsuits filed 
in recent years. They claim it is in the lawyer's own 
interest to build the case to gain the biggest possible 
settlement. Others say the victim gets too little of the 
award money. 
The attorney's fee is only one deduction from the 
money awarded to the victim. Also taken out are the 
expenses of the lawsuit itself. When the two items are 
added together, you can understand why so many 
victims complained when they received less of the 
award than their attorneys. 
The money received by plaintiffs involved in asbestos 
injury lawsuits in the last 10 years provides an example 
of the problems associated with contingency fees. Of 
each dollar of damages awarded, 41 cents typically 
went to attorneys for their fees or expenses. 
Who really pays the fees? 
Who pays the plantiffs' attorneys' contingency fees? It 
would be easy to say it is insurance companies and 
leave it at that. But ultimatdv it's vou—the 
consumer—who pays. It's your insurance premiums 
that are the source of the payments to these attorneys. 
Thus, these attorneys' fees cost you money daily. 
Some states have acted to correct the situation by 
putting a cap or maximum limit on the fee that a 
plaintiffs attorney can charge an accident victim. In 
other states, attorneys are required to file detailed 
statements showing how their settlements are spent— 
how much is needed to cover necessary expenses, how 
much to pay the attorney's fee, and how much to 
satisfy the victim's damages. 
Many state legislatures are considering other 
alternatives, as well. One such alternative is a sliding 
fee scale, with the percentage of the settlement that 
goes to the victim increasing as the settlement itself 
increases. Another idea is to make sure that customers 
of legal services have adequate information available to 
them when they shop for lawyers. For example, 
lawyers might be required to use a standard form 
itemizing the fee agreement. 
More ideas to consider 
Other measures deserving consideration include fines 
for filing frivolous lawsuits that are costly to defend, 
clog the courts, ai}d require taxpayers to foot the bill 
for additional courtrooms, judges, and support 
personnel. Anothdr possibility is awards for defense 
costs to people wtyo successfully defend themselves and 
prevail in suits, so they and their insurance companies 
don't have to pay for being proved innocent. 
We commend 1^1 efforts to bring legal costs into 
line and believe tfyat it will serve all aspects of the 
public to do so. 
Leo E. Denlea Jr(. 
Chairman of the 
Chief Executive 
Farmers Group, 
[Board and 
(pfficer 
Inc. 
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APPENDIX 6 
COMMENTARY 
§ 6 0 7 . 1 Impeachment: Components of Credibility 
The modes of impeachment potentially permissible depending upon 
the circumstances are (1) reputation for truth and veracity, Rule 608(a), 
(2) prior acts of misconduct, Rule 60S(b), (3) prior convictions, Rule 609, 
(4) partiality, i.e., interest, bias* corruption or coercion,5 (5) contradic-
tion by other evidence including conduct of the witness himself,6 and (6) 
self-contradiction with one's own prior inconsistent statement, Rules 
SOl(dXlXA) and 613.7 Impeachment by reference to matters of religion 
is never allowed, Rule 610. 
